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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations 
which are determinative of the issues addressed in the Reply Brief of Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ERRONEOUS INCLUSION 
OF THE HUSBAND'S SECTION 401(a) BENEFITS IN 
THE MARITAL ESTATE WHILE EXCLUDING THE 
WIFE'S SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS IS NOT 
OFFSET BY ANY DERIVATIVE CLAIM WHICH THE 
HUSBAND MAY HAVE TO SOCIAL SECURITY 
BENEFITS UNDER THE WIFE'S ACCOUNT. 
The Wife's brief contends that "[Husband] is eligible for Social Security benefits 
by reason of [Wifej's participation in Social Security in a marriage exceeding 10 years" 
and argues that this derivative eligibility of the Husband somehow redresses the 
inequity resulting from the District Court's inclusion of the Husband's § 401(a) social 
security substitute account, but not the Wife's social security benefits, in the marital 
estate. The Wife omits, however, two vital limitations on the Husband's derivative 
social security eligibility which completely vitiate her argument: 
(i) The eligibility of a divorced spouse for derivative social security benefits 
under an ex-spouse's coverage terminates upon remarriage. 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(H) 
provides, in relevant part: 
1 
[Ejvery divorced husband . . . of an individual entitled to 
old-age or disability insurance benefits, if such . . . divorced 
husband . . . is not married. . . shall . . . be entitled to a 
husband's insurance benefit.... 
Emphasis added. Thus, should the Husband remarry, he will have no derivative claim 
to social security benefits under the Wife's social security account. Since, as pointed 
out at page 8 of the Brief of Appellant, social security benefits are not a form of 
property and do not vest until received, consideration of such phantom benefits in 
dividing the marital estate at this point in time is an unwarranted exercise in 
speculation. Consideration of derivative benefits which the Husband might receive if 
he does not remarry, as urged by the Wife, would merely compound the speculation. 
(ii) Even if the Husband were to be eligible for benefits under the Wife's 
coverage, those benefits would be significantly and materially less than the benefits 
to which he would have been entitled had the Husband made contributions to a social 
security account in his own name. 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(2)(D) limits derivative benefits 
payable to a divorced husband in any month to one-half of the primary benefit payable 
to his ex-wife. Moreover, even that derivative benefit may be further reduced under 42 
U.S.C. § 402(c)(2)(A), which requires that the Husband reduce the derivative benefit 
(but not below zero) by two-thirds of the benefits he will receive under his pension 
from the Wasatch Front Regional Council. (The Husband does not contend that those 
pension benefits were not properly included in the marital estate.) 
(iii) Inclusion of the Husband's social security substitute benefits in the marital 
estate created material inequities. It is clear from the above-cited provisions of the 
2 
Social Security Act that the Husband will receive few benefits, if any, under the Wife's 
social security account. Without doubt, any such derivative benefits which he may 
receive will be far less than he would have received had he been a participant himself 
in social security. It is therefore clear that the District Cou. i failed to consider the 
significant inequities resulting from its disparate treatment of the Wife's social security 
benefits and the Husband's substitute social security benefits. In this regard, the 
decision below should be reversed. Even if the Husband's § 401(a) benefits are to be 
included in the marital estate, a new trial is necessary so that the District Court may 
receive and consider evidence as to the precise economic impact under the Social 
Security Act of such inclusion on the Husband and the Wife, respectively. 
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POINT n. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FAILURE TO JOIN THE 
CHILDREN IS JURISDICTIONAL AND MAY BE 
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
As this court noted in Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), 
"a court must have jurisdiction over both the subject matter of the dispute and the 
individuals involved. If the court lacks either type of jurisdiction, it has no power to 
entertain the suit." It is a widely accepted principle that the issue of jurisdiction may be 
raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Seidenbach's v. Bland Terry Shoe Corp., 
292 F.2d 206, 208 (10th Cir. 1961) ("The question . . . is jurisdictional and may be 
raised for the first time on appeal."); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis v. Adams, 718 
P.2d 508,513 (Colo. 1986) (although the issue of jurisdiction was raised neither at trial 
nor before the court of appeals, "the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter can be raised at any time, even for the first time in this [Supreme] Court."). It 
is well-settled that jurisdictional questions can be addressed by an appellate court sua 
sponte. H&VEngineering v. Board of Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 
1A1 P.2d 55, 57 (Idaho 1987) ("Even if jurisdictional questions are not raised by the 
parties, we are obligated to address them, when applicable, on our own initiative."). 
Accordingly, the District Court's lack of jurisdiction over the minor children of 
the marriage is both fatal to its purported disposition of their property and properly 
raised by the Husband in this appeal. As asserted in Point II of the Brief of Appellant, 
a clearer denial of the fundamental rights of due process of the children than occurred 
here cannot be imagined. 
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POINT m. 
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED "PLAIN ERROR" 
IN FINDING FRAUD ON THE PART OF THE 
HUSBAND IN HIS GIFTS TO THE MINOR CHILDREN. 
While it is the general rule that an issue not raised at trial may not be asserted 
on appeal, there is an exception where the trial court has committed "plain error". Slate 
v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920,922 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). An error is "plain" within the 
meaning of the exception, if from the appellate court's examination of the record, "it 
should have been obvious to a trial court that it was committing error." Stale v. 
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). 
The District Court's finding of fraud in connection with the Husband's gifts to his 
minor children was doubtless such plain error. As more fully argued in the Brief of 
Appellant, Point III, pp. 17 et seq., the District Court failed even to address the 
minimum elements of fraud under Utah law, omitting any finding of misrepresentation, 
concealment, intent, reliance or damage. Indeed, so far was the evidence from showing 
misrepresentation or concealment that the Wife acknowledged that the Husband had 
discussed with her putting money away in accounts for the children. R.1055. The 
District Court committed further "plain error" in entering its conclusory Finding 25, a 
clear violation of the rule that conclusory findings constitute reversible error. Sukin v. 
Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 925 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).1 
'Finding 25 makes no reference to facts showing fraud beyond the bald assertion that "The 
court has determined that those deposits were made by the Defendant without the knowledge of the 
PlaintifF. They were fraudulent and were an attempt by the Defendant to hide assets from the PlaintifF 
and transfer them to the parties' children under his control." R.1112. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Brief of Appellee fails to respond to the substance of Appellant's arguments, 
and, in asserting technical and procedural grounds in support of the decision of the 
District Court, misreads relevant sections of the Social Security Act and ignores well-
established principles which permit appellate courts to reverse "plain error" and to 
correct jurisdictional defects not raised below. The Court should therefore grant the 
relief requested in the Brief of Appellant. 
DATED this 2 € ^ d a y of December, 1994. 
CAMPBELL MAACK &3&SSIONS 
Jay W. Butler 
Attorneys for Defendant/Wppellant 
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